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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : C/OD/OSA

IDEA 1489

Copy *Hof* 9

DATE: 6 September 1963

FROM : C/IDEA/OD

| | |
|-----|------------|
| EDD | <i>P</i> |
| WER | |
| RDO | <i>Par</i> |
| RLP | <i>RP</i> |
| KB | |
| SHI | |
| PGS | |

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SUBJECT: Critique of Mission 171

1. Members present:

D/FA/OSA

IDEA/OD/OSA
VS/OSA

| |
|------------|
| ID/OSA |
| CS/OSA |
| CS/OSA |
| D/TECH/OSA |

Members absent: MD/OSA
SS/OSA

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2. covered the operations portion of this mission critique.

a. With the exception of the one deviation noted later, the route was flown as briefed without significant deviation. The track made good, closely approximated the briefed track.

b. The pilot deviated from point 00 because of low fuel. His fuel was 86 gallons below his curve, and 150 gallons below the handbook curve. This has since been determined to have been caused by leaving the gear down for most, if not all, of the mission. A message has been sent requesting a re-cap of SOP's and check lists used by the pilot. has also been asked to forward any procedures they use to prevent inadvertent or incorrect positioning of the gear, flaps and speed brakes. They have also been asked what cross-check items they use to determine whether or not any components, such as the gear or speed brakes, are in the wrong position. This item is closed as far as this critique is concerned, however, it remains an open item for continuing emphasis on all future missions.

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c. The mission penetrated at 64,500 feet, whereas the plan penetration altitude was 66,000 feet. The tape recording of the briefing showed that the pilot was briefed

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to enter at "approximately 67,000 feet". At 64,500 feet the pilot should have sensed something was wrong, preventing him from entering at his briefed altitude. A message has been sent [redacted] outlining the minimum penetration altitude requirements, and the tolerances which may be allowed because of temperature variations. The mission plan message will specify the minimum desired penetration altitude for any given mission. Plus or minus 500 feet has been given as the tolerance. Item closed.

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d. The [redacted] had too few points to accurately plot the track. There were [redacted] points reported in the [redacted] which were briefed points on the mission

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plan. It has been confirmed by a message [redacted] that these points were projected from intermediate plots, and were given as best points to plot since they were at the end of straight line segments. The location of two points in the 137 were incorrect. Several weather changes occurred according to the 137 at briefed points, that is, points outlined in the mission plan message. This is possible, but unlikely. The confusion here arises mainly in interpretation of [redacted] format in the Reports Control Manual. A message will be sent [redacted] reminding them of the need for sufficient points to accurately plot the mission route as flown, and also to specify that points must be plotted where a change of camera operation, weather conditions or a track deviation occurs.

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e. The flight line paragraph [redacted] was in error. Incorrect letters were used. This was corrected prior to the flight. It will be an item of continuing emphasis in the flight planning process in the future.

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f. Midway in the planning process, it was determined that the C-130 requested through Honolulu would not be available due to a hold on all C-130's in the Pacific area. After a series of message exchanges between Headquarters and Honolulu, the Detachment 2 C-118 was used. It took considerable coordination here at Headquarters. In the future it is proposed that, in anticipation of the nonavailability of C-130 aircraft, we ask Honolulu for "suitable airlift", rather than specify C-130. This will give them an option. If they are in doubt as to the definition of suitable aircraft, it is proposed that a C-118 or similar four engine aircraft be specified. Item closed.

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3. Weather was covered by [redacted]

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a. There was a close correlation between the briefed weather and the actual weather encountered. The pilot report was slightly more pessimistic than the actual weather from the tracker.


b. Several weather changes coincided with briefed points. This item will be corrected by Operations.

c. At this time the estimate of the percent of success on the mission was discussed. Up until now, we have been using the percent of the total route which was in relatively clear weather. In the future we will use as a guide line, the percentage of targets and target areas covered and photographed in category or better weather. We must allow for a judgement factor whenever large targets, such as the North Vietnam border area, are concerned. This item is open for coordination between weather and Intel. 3

4. The Intelligence aspects of this mission were covered by [redacted]

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e. [redacted] discussed how the Intelligence Division determines the suspect SAM site positions. This discussion was not necessarily germane to the critique, so it will be passed here.

f. See paragraph 3.c. above, for Intelligence coordination with weather for the estimate of mission success.

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5. Since Materiel Division was not represented, the aircraft and engine discrepancies from [redacted] are innumerable without comment.

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a. The interim trim was inoperative for fifteen minutes during the first forty minutes of flight.

b. The equipment bay pressure fluctuated approximately 1000 feet at two minute intervals during the entire flight.

c. The cabin pressure was 36,000 feet, at an aircraft altitude of 40,000 feet with the power in the idle position in descent.


d. [redacted] has been advised of the gear down condition on this flight, and he is seeking possible means of additional warnings systems in the cockpit.

6. The Communications aspects were discussed by [redacted]

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a. All systems are reported to have operated satisfactorily.



7. [redacted] reported on the camera operation.

a. There were no reported camera problems for this mission.

b. The programmer in the B configuration is suspected to be the next link in the system. There is an engineering change proposal in progress now to cure this.

c. [redacted] recommended the use of SO-130 film and the two speed shutter [redacted]. It will have to be used with high sun angles. The question remains now, how high must the sun angle be, and what are the operating limits of this system. It is recommended that this item be treated as a separate question elsewhere.

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8. At the conclusion of the individual presentations, [redacted] reviewed briefly how the reports of the critiques would be distributed. Each person who participates, or is to participate in the critique will receive a copy of the critique report. Each of these persons probably will have items which must be reported on, after the critique. The Chief of the Operations Division is to be notified whenever any corrective action has been taken on items which are brought up in the critiques.

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[redacted]
Lt. Colonel USAF
IDEA/OD/OSA

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